Assessing the Quality of Quality Assessment: The Role of Scheduling by Ibanez, Maria R. & Toffel, Michael Wayne
Assessing the Quality of Quality
Assessment: The Role of Scheduling
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Ibanez, Maria, and Michael W. Toffel. "Assessing the Quality of
Quality Assessment: The Role of Scheduling." Harvard Business
School Working Paper, No. 17-090, April 2017.
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33111773
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
 Assessing the Quality of Quality 
Assessment: The Role of Scheduling 
  
Maria R. Ibanez 
Michael W. Toffel 
 
Working Paper 17-090 
  
Working Paper 17-090 
 
 
Copyright © 2017 by Maria R. Ibanez and Michael W. Toffel 
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may 




Assessing the Quality of Quality 
Assessment: The Role of Scheduling  
  
Maria R. Ibanez 
Harvard Business School 
Michael W. Toffel 





Assessing the Quality of Quality Assessment: The Role of Scheduling† 
Maria R. Ibanez 
Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, mibanez@hbs.edu,  
 
Michael W. Toffel 
Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, mtoffel@hbs.edu  
 
April 14, 2017 
 
Many production processes are subject to inspection to ensure they meet quality, safety, and 
environmental standards imposed by companies and regulators. This paper explores how the 
scheduling of inspections risks introducing bias that erodes inspection quality by altering inspector 
stringency. We theorize that inspection results will be affected by (a) when the inspection occurs 
within an inspector’s daily schedule and (b) the inspection outcomes of the inspector’s prior 
inspected establishment. Analyzing thousands of food safety inspections, we find that inspectors 
cite fewer violations in successive inspections throughout their day and when inspections risk 
prolonging their typical workday. We also find that inspectors cite more violations after inspecting 
establishments that exhibited worse compliance or greater compliance deterioration. We discuss 
several implications for managers who schedule or rely on inspections.  
 
 
Keywords: quality; assessment; bias; inspection; scheduling; econometric analysis; empirical research; 
regulation  
 
1. Introduction  
Many companies inspect their own and their suppliers’ operations to ensure they are meeting quality, 
labor, and environmental standards. Various government agencies also conduct inspections for regulatory 
compliance. The accuracy of inspections is critical to their being a useful input to key managerial 
decisions, including how to allocate quality improvement resources, which suppliers to source from, and 
how to penalize compliance failures. Inaccurate assessments can prevent managers, workers, customers, 
and neighbors from making well-informed decisions based on the risks imposed by an establishment’s 
operations. Moreover, inspections that miss what they could have caught can undermine the inspection 
regime’s ability to deter intentional noncompliance. In this study, we theorize and find evidence of 
several sources of bias that lead to inaccurate inspections. We also propose solutions—including 
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alternative inspection scheduling regimes—that can improve inspection accuracy without increasing 
inspection costs.  
Several studies have revealed various sources of inspection inaccuracy. As most of these studies 
focus on general errors, little is yet known about inspector bias. We consider bias that results from an 
operational decision: scheduling, an unexplored type of bias. Building on work from the behavioral 
sciences, we hypothesize how the sequence of inspections might affect the number of violations cited. 
Specifically, inspector stringency on a particular inspection may be influenced by (1) its position within 
the day (daily schedule effects) and (2) the outcomes of the inspector’s prior inspection (prior inspection 
outcome effects, or, simply, outcome-effects). (Throughout this paper, we refer to an inspector’s 
preceding inspection as his or her “prior” inspection, and an establishment’s preceding inspection as its 
“previous” inspection.)  
We study the influence of scheduling on inspection accuracy in the context of local health 
department food safety inspections of restaurants and other food-handling establishments. While these 
inspections need to accurately assess compliance in order to protect consumer health, the number of 
violations cited in these reports is a function of both the facility’s actual hygiene at the time of the 
inspection and the inspector’s stringency in detecting and recording violations. Using data on thousands 
of inspections, we find strong evidence that inspectors’ schedules affect the violations cited in inspection 
reports.  
We hypothesize two daily schedule effects. We first theorize that each additional inspection over 
the course of a day causes fatigue that erodes inspectors’ stringency, which leads them to cite fewer 
violations. We find empirical evidence to support this, observing that each subsequent inspection during 
an inspector’s day yields 3.15% fewer violation citations, an effect that our supplemental analysis 
demonstrates is not due to inspectors’ scheduling presumably cleaner establishments later in their 
workday. Second, we hypothesize that inspections that risk prolonging an inspector’s workday will be 
conducted less stringently, which will lead to fewer violations being cited. We find empirical support for 
this, in that potentially shift-prolonging inspections yield 5.07% fewer violation citations.  
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We then hypothesize three ways in which an inspector’s experience at one inspection affects the 
number of violations cited at his or her next inspection. First, we hypothesize that an inspector’s 
stringency will be influenced by the number of violations at his or her prior inspection. Those violations 
will affect the inspector’s emotions and perceptions about the general compliance of the community of 
inspected establishments (via the salience of those recent inspection results), in turn altering his or her 
expectations and attitudes when inspecting the next establishment. This leads us to predict that having just 
conducted an inspection that cites more violations will lead the inspector to also cite more violations in 
the next establishment he or she inspects. As predicted, we find that each additional violation cited in the 
inspector’s prior inspection (of a different establishment) increases by 1.51% the number of violations 
that inspector cites at the next establishment he or she inspects.  
We hypothesize that trends matter, too: discovering more compliance deterioration (or less 
improvement) at one inspection affects inspectors’ emotions and perceptions in ways that lead them to 
cite more violations at the next establishment they visit. Supporting this hypothesis, we find that 
inspectors cite 1.31% more (fewer) violations after having inspected another establishment whose 
violation trend worsened (improved) by one standard deviation. Finally, we hypothesize that, based on 
negativity bias, this trend effect will be stronger following an inspection that found deterioration than one 
that found improvement. Indeed, we find empirical evidence that the trend effect is asymmetric, applying 
when compliance at the inspector’s prior establishment deteriorates but not when it improves.  
Our work contributes to both theory and practice. By identifying factors that bias inspections, our 
work contributes to the literature on monitoring and quality improvement (e.g., Gray, Siemsen, and 
Vasudeva 2015). Our focus on how scheduling affects inspector stringency introduces the operational lens 
of scheduling to the literature examining inspector bias, which has otherwise largely focused on 
experience or other sociological and economic factors (e.g., Short, Toffel, and Hugill 2016, Ball, 
Siemsen, and Shah 2017). Our examination of how operational decisions affect inspector behavior also 
contributes to the literature on behavioral operations, which emphasizes the importance of human 
behavior in operations management decisions (Bendoly, Donohue, and Schultz 2006, Gino and Pisano 
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2008). Our findings show that fatigue can affect performance of primary tasks even during normal shift 
hours. Moreover, by examining data from actual decisions with important consequences for public health, 
we contribute to the recent attempts to explore high-stakes decision-making in field settings (e.g., Chen et 
al., 2016). With managers across many different industries seeking to monitor and improve quality, our 
research suggests a cost-effective lever: exploiting the behavioral effects of the organization of work.  
2. Related Literature  
Our research builds on three streams of literature: monitoring organizations’ adherence to operational 
standards, the impact of inspectors’ efficacy and biases on inspection accuracy, and scheduling and task 
sequencing as drivers of task performance.  
2.1. Monitoring and Assessment of Standards Adherence 
Decades of scholarship have explored various approaches to ensuring that operations adhere to 
specifications provided by internal engineering and quality control departments, customers, and 
regulators. These approaches include statistical process control (e.g., Porteus and Angelus 1997), total 
quality management (e.g., Lapré, Mukherjee, and Van Wassenhove 2000), programs that encourage 
operators to self-disclose process errors and regulatory violations (Leape 2002, Gawande and Bohara 
2005, Toffel and Short 2011, Kim 2015), and electronic monitoring systems such as radio frequency 
identification (RFID) (Staats et al. 2016). Physical inspection remains a primary approach; for example, 
internal quality control departments assess manufacturing processes (Shah, Ball, and Netessine 2016) and 
internal auditors assess inventory records (Kök and Shang 2007). Some companies hire third-party 
monitors to assess their suppliers’ operations (Handley and Gray 2013, Locke 2013, Short and Toffel 
2016), including whether they are complying with standards such as the ISO 9001 quality management 
system standard (Corbett 2006, Levine and Toffel 2010, Gray, Anand, and Roth 2015), in part to protect 
the buying companies’ reputation. An extensive literature has highlighted the role of inspections in 
promoting operational routines and adherence to legally required Good Manufacturing Processes (e.g., 
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Anand, Gray, and Siemsen 2011, Gray, Siemsen, and Vasudeva 2015), occupational health and safety 
regulations (e.g., Ko, Mendeloff, and Gray 2010, Levine, Toffel, and Johnson 2012), and environmental 
regulations (for a review, see Shimshack 2014). Inspections have also been shown to have durable and 
cumulative beneficial effects on process control and compliance, with successive inspections yielding 
continuous improvement in working conditions as establishments resolve the concerns identified in 
inspections (Ko, Mendeloff, and Gray 2010, Toffel, Short, and Ouellet 2015).  
Given that inspections are costly, organizations use a variety of approaches to determine which 
establishments to prioritize. Several studies have explored tradeoffs between various targeting regimes. 
Some regimes seek to maximize the number of violations detected by prioritizing establishments 
suspected of being the worst performers (Harrington 1988, Kang et al. 2013), others prioritize 
establishments that have gone the longest without being inspected, and still others target all 
establishments with equal probability based on randomization (e.g., Lana 2003, Johnson, Levine, and 
Toffel 2017). Whereas those studies can help managers understand which establishments to prioritize 
over, say, the course of a year, little is known about the relative effectiveness of different approaches to 
sequencing inspections, the topic of our study.  
2.2. Inspection Accuracy  
The usefulness of inspections is contingent on their accuracy. Researchers have long been interested in 
how to conduct quality control inspections (e.g., Ballou and Pazer 1982), recognizing inspectors’ 
fallibility and variability (Feinstein 1989). The limited number of studies of the heterogeneity across 
inspectors’ propensity to report violations has identified the importance of their tenure, training, gender, 
and former exposure to the establishment (Macher, Mayo, and Nickerson 2011, Short, Toffel, and Hugill 
2016, Ball, Siemsen, and Shah 2017). Inspector scrutiny among third-party inspection firms has been 
shown to be influenced by (a) whether it is the inspected establishment or another party that hires the 
inspection firm and pays for the inspection (Ronen 2010, Duflo et al. 2013, Short and Toffel 2016), (b) 
the level of competition among inspection firms (Bennett et al. 2013), and (c) whether the inspecting firm 
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has cross-selling opportunities (Koh, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan 2013, Pierce and Toffel 2013). In contrast 
to these demographic aspects of individual inspectors and structural dimensions of the relationship 
between the inspection firm and the inspected establishment, we explore a very different potential source 
of inspection bias: where the inspection falls within an inspector’s schedule.  
2.3. The Drivers of Task Performance  
The literature examining task performance has focused mostly on how workers vary their pace in 
response to workload. Heavier workloads prompt workers to speed up (reducing service times) (Schultz et 
al. 1998, Kc and Terwiesch 2009, Kc and Terwiesch 2012, Tan and Netessine 2014, Delasay, Ingolfsson, 
and Kolfal 2016) and to shift tasks upstream (Batt and Terwiesch 2016) or downstream (Freeman, Savva, 
and Scholtes 2017). Extended periods of excessive workload can cause workers to slow down (Kc and 
Terwiesch 2009) and can erode service quality (Oliva and Sterman 2001). Heavier workloads can also 
lead workers to conduct fewer tasks (Oliva and Sterman 2001, Kc and Terwiesch 2012, Kuntz, 
Mennicken, and Scholtes 2015) and to conduct them less comprehensively, which can manifest as lower 
service quality (Kuntz, Mennicken, and Scholtes 2015, Berry Jaeker and Tucker 2016) and as incomplete 
documentation resulting in lost revenues (Powell, Savin, and Savva 2012). In contrast to workload, we 
focus on work schedule—in particular, examining how task sequence, tasks scheduled near the end of 
shift, and prior tasks affect service quality in the form of conducting comprehensive inspections. 
Research on the role of scheduling on task performance has investigated the optimal allocation of 
labor to tasks over time and has addressed problems such as machine inspection scheduling (Lee and 
Rosenblatt 1987) and workforce scheduling (Green, Savin, and Savva 2013). Studies of task sequencing 
have shown, for example, that scheduling similar tasks consecutively can improve performance by 
increasing task repetition and reducing delays incurred from switching tasks (e.g., Staats and Gino 2012, 
Ibanez et al. 2016). Recent work has begun to explore how task sequencing within a shift affects worker 
behavior and performance. For example, two recent studies find that healthcare workers work more 
quickly later in the shift (Deo and Jain 2015, Ibanez et al. 2016). In contrast to their focus on task speed, 
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we focus on task quality in a setting that purports to provide consistent quality inspections as the basis for 
a fair and objective monitoring regime.  
Another study finds that healthcare workers become less compliant with handwashing rules over 
the course of their shift (Dai et al. 2015). That study focused on adherence to a secondary task that was 
largely unobservable to others, where noncompliance was common, and where fatigue might lead 
workers to shift their attention from the secondary task toward their primary tasks. In contrast, our study 
focuses on primary tasks and on the outcome of such tasks—the number of violations cited—that is 
explicitly observable to others. Such visibility could deter variation. Moreover, whereas Dai et al. (2015) 
measured adherence dichotomously, we use a more nuanced scalar measure. 
A few recent articles based on psychology and behavioral economics have examined how various 
decisions are affected by the number of prior decisions in a given day and the outcomes of those 
decisions. One study of eight judges found that (a) they were more likely to deny parole (that is, to 
preserve the status quo) as they issued more judgments throughout the course of their day, suggesting that 
repeated decisions caused mental depletion, and (b) this bias was attenuated by a food break (Danziger, 
Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso 2011). A study of MBA application assessments found that the higher the 
cumulative average of the scores interviewers had given to applicants at a given moment on a given day, 
the lower the interviewers scored subsequent applicants that day, suggesting that decision makers exhibit 
bias to maintain a consistent daily acceptance rate (Simonsohn and Gino 2013). A third study found that 
judges, loan reviewers, and baseball umpires were more likely to make “accept” decisions immediately 
after a “reject” decision (and vice versa), exhibiting negative autocorrelation that results in decision errors 
(Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue 2016).1  
                                                      
1 These studies discuss several mechanisms. Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso (2011) argue that that the act of making 
decisions leads to mental depletion, which in turn increases the likelihood of easier decisions—rejecting requests. Simonsohn and 
Gino (2013) argue that their evidence is consistent with narrow bracketing; that is, decision makers dividing decisions into daily 
subsets and avoiding deviations from an expected overall acceptance rate for each subset. The authors propose three possible 
mechanisms: mental accounting (making daily decisions in line with a long-term evaluation target); the law of small numbers 
(underestimating the likelihood of sequential streaks occurring by chance); and pleasing supervisors believed to expect 
subordinates’ decisions to follow this pattern. The authors rule out contrast effects; that is, prior cases serving as reference points 
in the evaluation of the current case in which lower evaluations follow higher-quality cases and higher evaluations follow lower-
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Because inspectors are trained to be accurate, it is unclear whether they will be vulnerable to time 
or sequence effects. Moreover, if they are affected, the effects might be the opposite of what prior studies 
have shown. First, whereas judges were shown to become harsher as they made more decisions 
throughout the day, it is not obvious whether inspector behavior will follow suit, given that inspector 
harshness (which manifests as stringency) requires additional effort. Second, though prior work finds a 
negative correlation of decisions with the running average of prior decisions and with the latest decisions, 
inspectors do not have explicit or self-imposed quotas or targets and, as we explain below, their emotions 
and perceptions may be affected by their prior tasks in ways that promote positive correlation over time. 
Additionally, we go beyond what prior work has considered by proposing that the magnitude of the 
effects from prior task outcomes will be asymmetric, depending on whether those outcomes were positive 
or negative.   
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
Quality assurance audits and inspections have detailed procedures to be followed in pursuit of accuracy. 
Yet, in practice, behavioral biases may influence an inspector’s stringency. Whereas inspections are 
typically assumed to yield the same results no matter when they occur on the inspector’s schedule, we 
hypothesize that inspection results will indeed be influenced by when an inspection occurs during an 
inspector’s daily schedule—which we refer to as daily schedule effects—and by the type of experience 
inspectors have at their immediately prior inspection—which we refer to as prior inspection outcome 
effects. 
3.1. Daily Schedule Effects on Quality Assessment  
3.1.1. Inspector Fatigue. Inspectors’ work typically consists of a sequence of evaluative tasks 
that include physical tasks (such as manually examining the dimensions of a part or the temperature of a 
freezer) and mental tasks (such as interviewing an employee or determining whether a set of observations 
                                                                                                                                                                              
quality cases. Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016) conclude that the errors are consistent with the law of small numbers (or 
gambler’s fallacy) or sequential contrast effects and less consistent with quotas, learning, or fairness preferences.  
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is or is not within acceptable standards). As these tasks are executed, physical and mental fatigue will 
increase (Brachet, David, and Drechsler 2012). Furthermore, experimental evidence indicates that mental 
fatigue increases physical fatigue (Wright et al. 2007, Marcora, Staiano, and Manning 2009). 
Over the course of a day, inspectors’ physical and mental fatigue will reduce their physical and 
cognitive effort. This undermines stringency, which requires physical and cognitive efforts such as 
moving throughout the facility, interviewing personnel, waiting to observe work, executing procedures 
such as taking measurements, and conducting unpleasant tasks in undesirable conditions (such as 
observing storage practices in a walk-in freezer). Once an attribute is observed, inspectors need to recall 
and interpret the relevant standards to decide whether there is a violation and, if so, to document it. Each 
step must be executed according to rules that increase the complexity even of tasks that might appear 
simple to the untrained eye. Moreover, mental effort is required to make decisions against the status quo; 
as inspectors grow more tired during the day, they may become more willing to accept the status quo 
(Muraven and Baumeister 2000, Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso 2011), which in the context of 
inspections can take the form of passing inspection items. Finally, mental effort is also required to 
withstand the social confrontations that can erupt when a finding of noncompliance is disputed by those 
working at the establishment, who may genuinely disagree and for whom, in any case, much may be at 
stake in terms of reputation and sales. Citing violations can also provoke threats of appeals and lawsuits. 
Anticipating such responses, as they grow more fatigued, inspectors will exert less effort and seek to 
avoid confrontation, both of which contribute to their exhibiting more leniency. For all these reasons, we 
hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1: Inspectors will cite fewer violations as they complete more inspections 
throughout their daily schedule. 
 
3.1.2. Potential Shift Prolonging. Inspectors’ behavior may also be affected by whether, as they 
approach the end of the shift, they begin an inspection that would be anticipated to last beyond when they 
typically end work for the day. Because inspections require visiting the establishment, it is inefficient for 
the inspector to suspend an inspection once underway; the inspector would then have to bear the travel 
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cost again the next day to finish. The inability to interrupt an inspection, combined with a desire to finish 
at their typical time, may create pressure to speed up and inspect less thoroughly. In many settings, 
workers have discretion over their pace, which can lead them to prolong tasks to fill the time available 
(Hasija, Pinker, and Shumsky 2009) or else to conduct work more quickly when they perceive their 
workload to be higher than usual (Kc and Terwiesch 2012; Berry-Jaeker and Tucker 2016) and to avoid 
working unpaid hours beyond their shift (Chan 2015). As workers approach their typical end-of-shift 
time, accomplishing their remaining workload can become increasingly pressing as their perceived 
opportunity cost of time increases. Their desire to speed up work in these circumstances can result in the 
increased reliance on workarounds and cutting corners (Oliva and Sterman 2001) which, in turn, can 
reduce the quality of the work performed. Because properly conducted inspections require carefully 
evaluating a series of individual elements to identify whether each is in or out of compliance, omitting or 
expediting tasks to avoid prolonging their shift will result in a less comprehensive inspection and, 
consequently, fewer violations will be detected and cited. We therefore hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2: Inspectors will cite fewer violations at inspections when they are at risk of 
working beyond their end of shift. 
 
3.2. Prior Inspection Outcome Effects on Quality Assessment  
3.2.1. Violation Levels of the Inspector’s Prior Inspection. Inspectors are influenced not only 
by the sequencing of inspections within the day, but also by the results of prior inspections. One type of 
these outcome-effects is driven by whether the establishment an inspector just visited had many or few 
violations. There are two reasons why inspecting an establishment with many violations can imbue 
inspectors with a negative attitude that leads them to inspect more diligently at their next inspection, 
whereas inspecting a more compliant establishment can lead them to be less stringent in their subsequent 
inspection.  
First, an inspector’s prior inspection can affect him or her emotionally. Personnel at that prior 
establishment are likely to be more (less) dissatisfied and resentful when more (fewer) violations are cited 
and inspectors may absorb those emotions through emotional contagion (Barsade 2002), as well as 
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through interactions that are more (less) hostile (Neuman and Baron 1997). This, in turn, can influence 
inspectors’ goodwill and thus their stringency during the next inspection. 
Second, the experience at the inspector’s prior inspection can shape his or her perceptions 
regarding the overall behavior of establishments, which can influence his or her stringency at the 
subsequent inspection. Recently experiencing an event (such as compliance) increases its salience and 
results in more rapid recall. An inspector may therefore use the results of that inspection to update his or 
her estimate of typical compliance levels, relying on the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974) and seeking evidence at his or her next inspected establishment that supports these expectations, 
consistent with confirmation bias (Nickerson 1998). This becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the 
inspector’s heightened or reduced scrutiny detects more or fewer violations. We therefore hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 3:   The more (fewer) violations an inspector cites at one establishment, the more 
(fewer) violations he or she will cite in the next establishment.  
 
3.2.2. Violation Trend at the Inspector’s Prior Inspection. An inspector’s behavior is shaped 
not only by the prior establishment’s level of compliance, but also by its change in compliance relative to 
its previous inspection. This second type of outcome-effect also results from how the prior inspection 
affects the inspector’s emotions and perceptions.  
The inspector’s emotional response (through emotional contagion and interactions) at his or her 
prior establishment will depend on the trend there because the expectations of the establishment’s 
personnel will be based on its previous inspection; they will be pleased or displeased according to 
whether its violation count has decreased or increased. After visiting an establishment with greater 
improvement, the inspector will exhibit a more positive temperament and will approach his or her next 
inspection with greater empathy and less stringency. 
The inspectors’ perceptions, too, may be biased by the change in violations at the inspector’s 
prior establishment. Many inspectors view inspections as a cooperative endeavor with the regulated entity 
to help improve business operations and safeguards stakeholders (e.g., May and Wood 2003, Pautz 2009, 
Pautz 2010). Improved compliance may therefore be attributed to management taking the rules and 
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regulations seriously—that is, cooperating—whereas worsened compliance may be attributed to 
management ignoring or deliberately flouting the rules—definitely not cooperating. Improved compliance 
therefore confirms a cooperative relationship, which can lead inspectors to believe that the overall 
community of inspected establishments is cooperating and thus become less stringent in the next 
inspection. Worsened compliance can lead inspectors to believe that the overall community of inspected 
establishments is not cooperating and thus become more stringent in the next inspection. We therefore 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4:   The more an establishment’s compliance has deteriorated (improved), the more 
(fewer) violations an inspector will record at the next establishment.  
 
 
3.2.3. Violation Trend at the Inspector’s Prior Inspection: Asymmetric Effects of 
Deterioration versus Improvement. According to the principle of negativity bias, negative events are 
generally more salient and dominant than positive events (Rozin and Royzman 2001). Negative events 
instigate greater information processing to search for meaning and justification, which in turn strengthens 
the memory and tends to spur stronger and more enduring effects in many psychological dimensions 
(Baumeister et al. 2001).  
Negativity bias can affect the impact of the prior inspection’s violation trend on the inspector’s 
emotions and perceptions. First, negativity bias implies that for the inspected establishment’s staff, the 
negative emotional effect of a drop in compliance may be stronger than the positive emotional effect of an 
improvement. This would result in a stronger conveyance to inspectors of negative emotions associated 
with a drop in compliance and a weaker conveyance of positive emotions associated with an 
improvement. An inspector will then absorb more negative emotions after the negative finding than 
positive emotions after the positive finding. Moreover, as argued by Barsade (2002), mood contagion 
might be more likely for unpleasant emotions because of higher attention and automatic mimicry. These 
asymmetries in the extent to which declining versus improving conditions affect inspectors’ emotions will 
lead, in turn, to asymmetric effects on the strength of the resulting positive versus negative outcome-
effects.  
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Second, the salience of negative outcomes may have a stronger effect on inspectors’ perceptions 
about how all of the establishments they monitor generally think about compliance, which can shape their 
stringency in a subsequent inspection. This is due to the status-quo bias: with the status quo acting as the 
reference point, negative changes are perceived as larger than positive changes of the same magnitude 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988, Kahneman 2003). We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5:   Observing deteriorated conditions at an establishment will increase the 
inspector’s stringency at the next establishment to a greater extent than observing 
improved conditions will reduce his or her stringency.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Empirical Context: Food Safety Inspections 
Our hypotheses are ideally tested in an empirical context in which inspectors (a) conduct multiple 
inspections per day and (b) work individually, which avoids the challenge of discerning individuals’ 
behaviors from those of co-inspectors. Food safety inspections—in which environmental health officers 
working for local health departments inspect restaurants and other food-handling establishments to protect 
consumers by monitoring compliance and educating kitchen managers—fulfill both criteria. Moreover, 
food safety inspections, commonly known as restaurant health inspections, are designed to minimize 
foodborne illness; noncompliance can jeopardize consumer health. The quality of these assessments—and 
their ability to safeguard public health—depends on the accuracy of inspectors. 
Foodborne disease in the US is estimated to cause 48 million illnesses resulting in 128,000 
hospitalizations and 3,000 deaths each year, imposing billions of dollars of medical costs and costs 
associated with reduced productivity and with pain and suffering (Scallan et al. 2011, Scharff 2012, 
Minor et al. 2015). Violations can affect firms’ reputations and revenues and can trigger organizational 
responses that range from additional training for responsible personnel to legal representation to refute 
citations.  
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Several prior studies have examined food safety inspections. For example, Lehman, Kovács, and 
Carroll (2014) found that consumers are less concerned about food safety at restaurants they perceive to 
be more “authentic.” Others have investigated the extent to which restaurants improve hygiene practices 
once they were required to disclose their inspection results to consumers via restaurant grade cards (Jin 
and Leslie 2003, Simon et al. 2005, Jin and Leslie 2009). More recent studies have found that online 
customer reviews of restaurants contain text that reflects hygiene conditions that can predict health 
inspections results (Kang et al. 2013) and can increase inspector effectiveness if health inspection 
agencies take them into account when prioritizing establishments for inspection (Glaeser et al. 2016).  
Because inspectors need evidence to justify citing violations (and thus can only cite violations if 
they are truly present), studies of inspection bias (e.g., Bennett et al. 2013, Duflo et al. 2013, Short, 
Toffel, and Hugill 2016) are based on the assumption that deviations from the true number of violations 
are only due to underdetection, and that bias does not lead inspectors to cite violations that are not 
actually present. This assumption was validated in our interviews with inspectors, and underlies our 
empirical approach. Moreover, because violations are based on regulations regarding food operations 
based on science-based guidance for protecting consumers, each violation item is relevant.  
We purchased data from Hazel Analytics, a company that gathers restaurant inspections from 
several local governments across the United States, processes the information to create electronic 
datasets, and sells these datasets to researchers and to companies—such as restaurant chains—interested 
in monitoring their licensees. These datasets include information about the inspected establishment 
(name, identification number, address, city, state, ZIP code), the inspector, the inspection type, the date, 
the times when the inspection began and ended, the violations recorded, and, where available, the 
inspector’s comments on those violations.  
We purchased all of Hazel Analytics’ inspection datasets that included inspection start and end 
times as well as unique identifiers for each inspector, all of which are necessary to observe inspector 
schedules. This included all food safety inspections conducted in Lake County, Illinois from September 4, 
2013, to October 5, 2015; Camden County, New Jersey from September 4, 2012, to September 24, 2015; 
15 
and in the state of Alaska from December 8, 2007, to October 4, 2015. (These date ranges reflect all 
inspections from these domains that Hazel Analytics had coded.) Our estimation sample omits (a) 
inspector-days for which we cannot adequately calculate relevant variables based on what appear to be 
data entry errors that we were unable to correct (for example, when there was ambiguity about inspection 
sequence) and (b) inspections that are dropped by our conditional fixed-effects Poisson specification. 
Details are provided in Appendix A. This results in an estimation sample containing 12,017 inspections of 
3,399 establishments conducted by 86 inspectors on 6,880 inspector-days in Camden County, New Jersey 
(1,402 inspections), Lake County, Illinois (8,962 inspections), and the state of Alaska (1,653 inspections). 
(These sample restrictions do not affect our inferences, as all of our hypothesized results continue to hold 
when using alternative specifications estimated on all inspections in the raw dataset, as described in 
Appendix A.) 
Our interviews with managers and inspectors at health inspection departments represented in our 
dataset indicate that inspectors have limited discretion over scheduling their inspections. Each inspector is 
responsible for inspecting all establishments within his or her assigned geographic territory2 and 
inspectors are rotated to different territories every two or three years. Inspectors are instructed to schedule 
their inspections by prioritizing establishments based on their due dates, which are computed based on 
previous inspection dates and the required inspection frequency for each establishment type.3 To 
minimize travel time, inspectors are instructed to group inspections with similar due dates by geographic 
proximity.  
Though inspectors also carry out many administrative duties (such as reviewing records, 
answering emails, and attending department meetings at the office), the main components of their work 
are the inspections and the associated travel. Inspectors typically review the most recent inspections as 
                                                      
2 Temporary exceptions are provided in special situations, such as staffing shortages, sick leave, or vacation. 
3 Required inspection frequency varies based on the riskiness of an establishment’s operations. For example, those selling only 
prepackaged foods impose lower risk of foodborne illness and are thus required to be inspected less often than those that handle 
raw ingredients or that prepare and store hot or cold food more than 12 hours before serving. This prioritization is facilitated by 
software that health inspection departments use to track inspections, which allows sorting of the establishments to be inspected 
by due date. 
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they prepare for their next inspections. Traveling between their office and establishments to inspect 
represents a substantial portion of inspectors’ days because of the geographical dispersion in the areas 
covered by our data. Inspectors are discouraged from working overtime.  
4.2. Measures  
 4.2.1. Dependent and Independent Variables. We measure violations as the total number of 
violations cited in each inspection, a typical approach used by others (e.g., Helland 1998, Stafford 2003, 
Langpap and Shimshack 2010, Short, Toffel, and Hugill 2016). 
We measure an inspector’s schedule-induced fatigue at a given inspection as the number of prior 
inspections today, computed as the number of inspections that the inspector had already conducted before 
the focal inspection on the same day. Thus, this variable is coded 0 for an inspector’s first inspection of 
the day, 1 for the second, and so on.4  
To measure whether an inspection might reasonably be anticipated to conclude after the 
inspector’s typical end-of-shift time, we created an indicator variable, potentially shift-prolonging, coded 
1 when the anticipated end time of an inspection (calculated as the inspection start time plus the duration 
of that establishment’s previous inspection) falls after the inspector’s running average daily clock-out 
time based on all of that inspector’s preceding days in our sample, and coded 0 otherwise.  
Prior inspected establishment’s violations is the number of violations the inspector cited at the 
establishment inspected prior to the focal inspection, whether minutes or days earlier.  
Prior inspected establishment’s violation trend is calculated as the percentage change in the 
number of violations at that establishment between that day’s inspection and its previous inspection (we 
added one to the denominator to avoid dividing by zero).  
We create two indicator variables to distinguish whether the inspector’s prior establishment had 
improved, deteriorated, or not substantially changed its number of violations compared to its previous 
                                                      
4 We also conduct our analyses measuring schedule-induced fatigue in three alternative ways: the inspector’s actual, anticipated, 
or predicted cumulative minutes already spent that day conducting inspections. See the Robustness Tests section for details.  
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inspection. We classify an establishment’s violation trend as improved saliently (or deteriorated saliently) 
if its current inspection yielded at least two fewer (more) violations than its previous inspection. (The 
intermediate case, in which the number of violations differed by only one or remained constant, serves as 
the baseline condition.) We create the dummy variables prior inspected establishment saliently improved, 
coded 1 when the inspector’s prior inspected establishment improved saliently and 0 otherwise, and prior 
inspected establishment saliently deteriorated, coded 1 when the inspector’s prior inspected establishment 
deteriorated saliently and 0 otherwise. An inspection conducted immediately after the inspection of an 
establishment whose performance change was only one or no violations is considered the baseline 
condition.  
4.2.2. Control Variables. We measure inspector experience as the cumulative number of 
inspections the inspector had conducted (at any establishment) since the beginning of our sample period 
by the time he or she began the focal inspection.  
We create an indicator variable, returning inspector, coded 1 when the inspector of the focal 
inspection had inspected the establishment beforehand and 0 otherwise.  
We create two indicator variables to designate the time of day the inspection began: breakfast 
period (midnight to 10:59 am) and dinner period (4:00 pm–11:59 pm), with the remaining lunch period 
(11:00 am–3:59 pm) serving as (omitted) baseline condition. We also create a series of indicator variables 
specifying the month and the year of the inspection.  
We create a series of indicator variables to control for whether the inspection is the 
establishment’s nth inspection (second through tenth or more), each of which indicates whether an 
inspection is the establishment’s first, second, third (and so on) inspection in our sample period. 
We create a series of inspection-type dummies to indicate whether the inspection was routine, 
routine-education, related to permitting, due to a complaint, an illness investigation, or a follow-up. 
Routine inspections are conducted to periodically monitor establishments; routine-education inspections 
are particular cases of routine inspections in which an educational presentation is conducted to train 
establishment staff. These two types represent 79% of the inspections in our estimation sample. Permit 
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inspections are conducted when establishments change ownership or undergo construction, upgrades, or 
remodeling. Complaint inspections are triggered by the local health department receiving a complaint; 
complaint risk inspections are those that might have been so triggered.5 Illness investigation inspections 
are those conducted to investigate a possible foodborne illness (food poisoning). A follow-up inspection 
(or re-inspection) is conducted to verify that violations in a preceding inspection have been corrected and 
thus is of limited scope. Other inspections (the omitted category) include visits to confirm an 
establishment’s deactivation/closure, temporary events such as outdoor festivals, mobile establishments, 
and vending machines; this serves as the omitted category in our empirical specifications.  
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics and reports correlations.6 
4.3. Empirical Specification 
We test our hypotheses by estimating the following model:  
Yijen = F(β1 ηij + β2 λij + β3 ρi,j-1 + β4 δi,j-1 + β5 ϕj + β6 µijen + β7 τijen + β8 νn + β9 γijen + β10 IEie + εijen), 
where Yijen is the number of violations cited in the nth inspection of establishment e that was conducted 
by inspector i and that was his or her jth inspection in our sample. F(·) refers to the Poisson function.  
ηij is inspector i’s number of prior inspections today. λij refers to whether the inspection was 
potentially shift-prolonging. ρi,j-1 is the inspector’s prior inspected establishment’s violations; that is, the 
number of violations that inspector i cited at the immediately preceding inspection of another 
establishment. δi,j-1 refers to the prior inspected establishment’s violation trend or, in some specifications, 
the two variables that indicate particular ranges of that variable: prior inspected establishment saliently 
improved and prior inspected establishment saliently deteriorated. 
                                                      
5 The Camden data does not explicitly code as “complaint inspections” those that were conducted in response to a complaint. We 
were able to identify which Camden inspections were at risk of being triggered by complaints, and coded these as complaint risk 
inspections. Specifically, we obtained a list from the Camden County Department of Health and Human Services that includes 
the dates and times when the department received a complaint and the name of the inspector who was sent to investigate it, but 
not the identity of the establishment. These inspectors investigate these complaints either the day they are received or the next 
day. Because we do not know which specific inspection corresponds to a complaint, we categorize as complaint risk inspection 
all (so-called) routine inspections that the assigned inspector conducted later in the day when the complaint was received and for 
all inspections that the inspector conducted the next day. In the few instances in which Camden’s complaint list did not identify 
the inspector assigned, we categorize as complaint risk inspection all Camden routine inspections conducted later in the day when 
those complaints were received and throughout the next day.  
6 Supplemental descriptive statistics are provided in Table B1 in Appendix B. 
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We include ϕj to control for inspector experience (Short, Toffel, and Hugill 2016). We control for 
returning inspector (µijen) because inspectors who return to an establishment they had inspected before 
tend to behave differently than inspectors who are new to the establishment (Short, Toffel, and Hugill 
2016, Ball, Siemsen, and Shah 2017).  
The vector τijen includes breakfast period and dinner period to control for the possibility that an 
establishment’s cleanliness might vary over the course of a day and because prior research indicates that 
many individual behaviors are affected by time of day (Linder et al. 2014, Dai et al. 2015).7 τijen also 
includes fixed effects for the month of the inspection and fixed effects for the year of the inspection. 8  
We include a series of fixed effects to control for the establishment’s nth inspection (second 
through tenth or more) (νn) because research has shown that other types of establishments improve 
compliance over subsequent inspections (Ko, Mendeloff, and Gray 2010, Toffel, Short, and Ouellet 
2015).  
To accommodate the possibility that different types of inspection might mechanically result in 
different numbers of violations (e.g., due to different scope), the model includes inspection type dummies 
(γijen).  
Finally, we include fixed effects for every inspector-establishment combination (IEie). These 
inspector-establishment dyads control for all time-invariant inspector characteristics (such as gender and 
formal education) and all time-invariant establishment characteristics (such as cuisine type and 
geographic domain). Thus, our specification identifies changes in the number of violations that a 
particular inspector cited when inspecting a given establishment on different occasions. Note that this 
approach is more conservative than including separate sets of fixed effects for inspectors and for 
                                                      
7 Results are robust to using hourly dummies, except that the potentially shift-prolonging effect is no longer statistically 
significant, which is not surprising because it is related to the end-of-shift times.  
8 Results are robust to including a series of indicator variables for the day of the week.   
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establishments.9 By including inspector-establishment fixed effects, we focus on variation within an 
establishment-inspector dyad, which avoids concerns that spatial correlation is driving our results.10  
4.4. Identification 
Empirical support for our hypothesis that inspector fatigue reduces stringency (H1) would 
manifest as inspections conducted later in an inspector’s daily schedule exhibiting fewer violations. The 
results of some preliminary analyses bolster our claim that such a trend is driven by inspector fatigue 
rather than two alternative explanations. One potential alternative explanation is that daily trends in 
customer visits and staffing levels could result in temporal trends in staff cleaning effort that might result 
in establishments exhibiting better hygiene conditions as the day wears on. The inspectors we interviewed 
indicated that it would be unlikely for hygiene conditions to routinely improve throughout the day and 
that, in fact, hygiene conditions may often get worse throughout the day as more customers are served. 
They also noted that many violations reflect poor procedures that are unlikely to shift throughout the 
day—such as poor labeling of packages and poor documenting procedures—and improperly functioning 
sinks. We nonetheless control for potential variation in establishments’ cleanliness at different periods of 
the day by including fixed effects for time of day.  
A second potential alternative explanation is that inspectors might intentionally arrange their 
daily schedules to begin with the establishments they expect will yield more violations, leaving the easier 
establishments for later in the day. Even if establishments with more expected violations were routinely 
scheduled earlier in the day by some inspectors, our inclusion of establishment-inspector-dyad fixed 
effects controls for time-invariant characteristics of establishments and inspectors. Moreover, we 
conducted the following analyses that enable us to rule out that establishments were being sequenced in 
                                                      
9 We find similar results when we estimate an alternative model including separate sets of fixed effects for inspectors and for 
establishments. Because estimating this two-way fixed effects model using Poisson regression led to convergence problems, we 
instead used ordinary least squares regression with a log-transformed dependent variable (specifically, log of violations after 
adding 1).  
10 Specifically, our approach addresses potential concerns that spatial correlation might be driving our hypothesized (H3) positive 
correlation in violations cited at establishments that inspectors visit sequentially. Proximate establishments that inspectors tend to 
visit sequentially might exhibit similar violation counts because they share neighborhood characteristics that might affect the 
supply of and demand for compliance. 
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this manner. In particular, our dataset enables us to observe establishments’ previous inspections, which 
inspectors also use to assess historical inspection outcomes. We therefore looked for evidence of such a 
trend by examining whether an inspector tended to start his or her shift with establishments that had more 
violations in their previous inspection, as our interviews with inspectors indicated they anticipated such 
establishments being especially likely to have violations in subsequent inspections. We used two 
approaches to examine this. First, we conducted a test to assess whether an establishment’s number of 
violations at its previous inspection was related to the sequence in which it was subsequently inspected. 
After tabulating the number of violations from an establishment’s previous inspection against its focal 
inspection sequence, a Pearson's chi-squared test indicated that previous violations were not significantly 
related to the focal inspection sequence (χ2 = 139, p = 1.00). We also created a box-and-whisker plot to 
visually confirm this result (see Figure B1 in Appendix B). This plot reveals stable medians and 
interquartile ranges of establishments’ previous violations irrespective of the establishments’ focal 
sequence and thus provides no visual evidence that inspectors created their daily schedules based on 
establishments’ previous violation counts. Second, we estimated a Poisson regression of inspection 
sequence on number of violations from that establishment’s previous inspection and inspector-day fixed 
effects, clustering standard errors by inspector-day. Our results (β = 0.009, S.E. = 0.003, p < 0.01) 
indicate that this effect is trivial: establishments with one standard deviation more violations in their 
previous inspection (that is, 2.5 violations) were, in their subsequent inspection, scheduled 0.02 later in an 
inspector’s sequence (calculated as the product of the variable’s mean and coefficient, or 2.5 * 0.009 = 
0.02). The inverse of this coefficient indicates that, on average, inspectors would schedule an 
establishment one step later in their daily sequence if it had 111 more violations (44 standard deviations) 
than another establishment—a number that is outside the rage of outcomes and thus impossible. This tiny 
effect enables us to rule out that inspectors, to any meaningful degree, intentionally sequence the day’s 
inspections based on difficulty. Moreover, the direction of this small effect enables us to rule out that 
inspectors schedule their more difficult inspections earlier in their day. This indicates that, if anything, the 
ordering of inspections would bias against our hypothesized effect.  
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Collectively, the results of our investigating these two concerns (a) indicate that none of these 
factors are threats to our identification, and (b) increase the confidence with which we can identify the 
effects of inspector fatigue on stringency. 
We next consider identification issues with respect to H2. Our hypothesis that an inspection being 
potentially shift-prolonging will reduce the number of violations cited raises a potential concern that 
inspectors might intentionally schedule as potentially shift-prolonging those inspections that they 
anticipate will yield fewer violations. We used two approaches to examine this. First, we calculated the 
number of violations at each establishment’s previous inspection and found this average to be 3.1 for 
establishments whose subsequent inspection was potentially shift-prolonging and 2.3 for establishments 
whose subsequent inspection was not. A Pearson's chi-squared test indicates that the difference in these 
distributions is statistically significant (χ2 = 243, p < 0.01), which provides strong evidence that inspectors 
did not intentionally schedule establishments expected to have fewer violations as potentially shift-
prolonging. Second, we estimated a conditional logistic regression of the potentially shift-prolonging 
indicator on the number of violations from that establishment’s previous inspection and inspector-day 
fixed effects, clustering standard errors by inspector-day. The results (β = 0.104, S.E. = 0.013, p < 0.01, 
odds ratio = 1.11) indicate that an additional violation in the establishment’s previous inspection slightly 
increases the odds of being potentially shift-prolonging, which would only be a bias against our 
hypothesized effect. Collectively, these results increase the confidence with which we can identify the 
hypothesized effect of an inspection being potentially shift-prolonging on the number of violations cited. 
Finally, we consider the identification of the prior inspection outcome effects hypothesized in H3-
H5. If inspectors intentionally scheduled their inspections based on their expected outcomes (for example, 
by inspecting those they expect to have high violations in one week and those they expect to have fewer 
violations in another week), such sorting could drive our findings. Our interviews with managers and 
inspectors suggest that this is not the case and that inspections are grouped by location to minimize travel 
time because travel represents a large proportion of an inspector’s time and thus cost. While it is possible 
that violations are spatially correlated (due, for example, to community economic demographics), our 
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inclusion of establishment-inspector-dyad fixed effects controls for such time-invariant characteristics of 
the establishments. In other words, our identification strategy is based on the focal establishment’s 
deviation from its average violations cited by a particular inspector. Moreover, our inclusion of month 
and year fixed effects controls for contemporaneous shocks (such as economic cycles) that might affect 
establishments’ willingness or ability to manage hygiene. 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Model Results.  We estimate the count model using fixed-effects Poisson regression and 
report standard errors clustered by establishment (Table 3).11 Our results are robust to several alternatives: 
clustering standard errors by inspector, estimating the model with negative binomial regression with 
conditional fixed effects, and estimating the model using ordinary least squares regression predicting log 
violations. Multicollinearity is not a serious concern, given that variance inflation factors (VIFs) are less 
than 1.7 for all hypothesized variables and less than 6.1 for all variables except three of the inspection-
type indicators. Because our specifications control for a variety of factors that affect the number of 
violations cited, we interpret coefficients on the hypothesized variables as evidence of bias, the same 
approach used by prior studies (e.g., Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue 2016, Short, Toffel, and Hugill 2016). 
Because deviations from the true number of violations are assumed to result only from underdetection (as 
described above), we interpret negative coefficients to indicate the extent of underdetection occurring, 
whereas positive coefficients indicate the extent to which underdetection is avoided. We interpret effect 
sizes based on incidence rate ratios (IRRs).  
We test Hypotheses 1-4 using Model 1. We begin by interpreting the coefficients on our control 
variables. The estimated coefficient on inspector experience is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that, all else constant, the number of violations cited per inspection increases as the inspector 
conduct inspections over time, albeit by a small amount on an inspection-by-inspection level. The 
                                                      
11 Poisson panel estimators are consistent even if the data are not Poisson distributed, provided the conditional mean is correctly 
specified (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon 1984, Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Wang 2010, Cameron and Trivedi 2010). Because 
of the weaker distributional assumption of the Poisson panel estimators, they may be more robust than negative binomial 
regression (Cameron and Trivedi 2010). 
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negative and statistically significant coefficient on returning inspector (β = -0.116, p < 0.01) indicates 
that inspectors who return to an establishment cite 11% fewer violations than inspectors who had not 
inspected that establishment beforehand, which is also consistent with prior studies. Considering time-of-
day effects, we note that, on average, inspections conducted earlier in the day cite 6% more violations 
than inspections conducted during the lunch period, whereas inspections conducted during the dinner and 
lunch periods cite statistically indistinguishable numbers of violations. The estimated coefficients on the 
establishment’s nth inspection (not reported) indicate that fewer violations were cited at successive 
inspections of a given establishment, a result consistent with prior research that has examined other types 
of inspections. For example, the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable denoting an establishment’s 
third inspection (β = - 0.209, p < 0.01) indicates that those inspections cite 19% fewer violations on 
average than its initial inspection. 
We find support for daily schedule effects. The negative, statistically significant coefficient on 
number of prior inspections today (β = - 0.032, p < 0.01) indicates that inspections conducted later in an 
inspector’s daily schedule yield fewer violations. This suggests that fatigue reduces stringency, providing 
support for H1. The coefficient magnitude indicates that each subsequent inspection during the day results 
on average in 3.15% fewer violations cited. The results also indicate that inspections that risked extending 
an inspector’s workday yielded fewer violations, as predicted by H2. The negative statistically significant 
coefficient on potentially shift-prolonging (β = -0.052, p < 0.05) indicates that such inspections result in 
5.07% fewer citations.  
To explore the influence of the outcome of the inspector’s prior inspected establishment, we first 
consider the number of violations cited in that inspection. The coefficient on prior inspected 
establishment’s violations is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.015, p < 0.01), which supports 
H3. Each additional citation at the establishment inspected immediately before the focal inspection 
increases the number of violations cited in the focal inspection by 1.51%. The statistically significant 
positive coefficient on prior inspected establishment’s violation trend (β = 0.013, p < 0.05) supports H4. 
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A one-standard-deviation increase in this trend increases the number of citations in the focal inspection by 
1.31%. Note that this is in addition to the effect of the number of violations (H3).  
To test H5, Model 2 replaces prior inspected establishment’s violation trend with the indicator 
variables prior inspected establishment saliently improved and prior inspected establishment saliently 
deteriorated. The baseline condition occurs when the establishment the inspector visited immediately 
prior to the focal inspection exhibited no more than one violation more or less than it did in its previous 
inspection. Compared to this baseline condition, our results indicate that inspectors cite more violations in 
inspections conducted after their prior inspected establishment exhibits salient deterioration (β = 0.075, p 
< 0.01). The IRR indicates that, on average, an inspector who has just inspected an establishment that 
exhibited salient deterioration will report 8% more violations in the focal inspection. However, we find no 
evidence that observing salient improvement in the prior inspected establishment has any effect on the 
number of violations cited in the focal inspection. A Wald test indicates that these effects significantly 
differ (Wald χ2 = 4.21, p < 0.05), which supports H5: observing salient deterioration in the prior inspected 
establishment has a statistically significant stronger spillover effect than observing salient improvement 
does on an inspectors’ next inspection.  
4.5.2. Results Interpretation. To better understand the magnitude of the estimated effects, we 
estimate the impacts of daily schedule effects and outcome-effects on violations for the average 
inspection, scale up the results across the entire United States, and translate the results into healthcare 
outcomes and costs. We report these results in Table 4. 
We first consider the average impact per inspection. Specifically, we compare the status quo (that 
is, the current practice with its associated scheduling effects) with six alternative scenarios described in 
each row of Table 4, each of which mitigates one or more of the effects we identified. We make all these 
comparisons based on Model 1 in Table 3. We calculate average predicted values under each scenario 
based on the model’s estimates after recoding to zero, one at a time, number of prior inspections today, 
potentially shift-prolonging, prior inspected establishment’s violations, and prior inspected 
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establishment’s violation trend, and then simultaneously recoding to zero the first two of these variables 
(related to daily schedule effects), and then the latter two (outcome-effects). These results are reported in 
Column 1 of Table 4. For the status quo, we use the model’s estimates to calculate the average predicted 
number of violations per inspection, based on actual values of all variables, to be 2.42365. Column 2 
reports the percent change in the average predicted violations that compares each of these scenarios to the 
status quo. This shows the average impact per inspection, which takes into account both the magnitude of 
the effect(s) and their frequency.  
Consider the scenario depicted in row 1, in which we estimate the violations and hospitalizations 
that would occur in the absence of the fatigue affect associated with prior inspections conducted in a 
given day. We nullify this effect by recoding to zero number of prior inspections today for all 
observations (and preserve the actual values for all other variables). Using the estimates from Model 1 of 
Table 4, we then calculate the average predicted number of violations to be 2.498 (Column 1). As noted 
in Column 2, this scenario would result in 3.1% more violations cited per inspection than the status quo of 
2.42365 violations cited per inspection (Column 2).12 This same approach suggests that eliminating the 
potentially shift-prolonging effect would increase violations cited per inspection by 1.4%. Thus, even 
though the estimated coefficient magnitudes described in the prior section indicate that, on average, each 
subsequent inspection during the day results in 3.15% fewer violations being cited per inspection and that 
potentially shift-prolonging inspections result in 5.07% fewer violations being cited per inspection, we 
find that eliminating the number of prior inspections today effect would have a larger impact than 
eliminating the potentially shift-prolonging effect. 
We then estimate the potential nationwide implications of our calculations based on the 
assumption that the estimated one million food establishments that are monitored by state, local, and 
tribal agencies in the United States13 are each inspected annually, and that our sample of inspections is 
                                                      
12 We calculate 3.1% as (2.49802 - 2.42365) / 2.42365. 
13 US Food and Drug Administration, “Retail Food Protection,” 
http://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/retailfoodprotection/, last updated Sep. 9, 2016, accessed Jan. 1, 2017.  
27 
typical of those conducted across the country. To calculate a nationwide figure, we take the difference 
between the average predicted values from each scenario and the status quo (that is, the Column 1 figure 
minus 2.42365), and multiply that by the one million inspections conducted annually across the country 
(Column 3).  
Returning to the first scenario, which considers the impact of eliminating the number of prior 
inspections today effect, we scale the difference in average predicted violations per inspection that arise in 
this scenario compared to the status quo (2.49802 - 2.42365) by the one million inspections conducted 
annually nationwide, which yields 74,370 violations nationwide per year. Thus, if the inspector fatigue 
associated with prior inspections in a given workday could be eliminated, we estimate that 74,370 
additional violations per year nationwide that are currently undetected would be cited (Column 3, row 1). 
This same approach leads us to estimate that eliminating the potentially shift-prolonging effect we 
identified would result in the citation of 33,020 undetected violations per year nationwide (row 2). 
Turning to the outcome effects, this approach indicates that 94,110 violations per year nationwide would 
not have been cited in the absence of the effect of prior inspected establishment’s violations, and 18,750 
would not have been cited in the absence of the effect of prior inspected establishment’s violation trend 
(rows 4 and 5). 
To evaluate the implications of these estimated nationwide violation counts associated with 
schedule effects, we translate these results into health outcomes, as well as associated costs. First, we 
convert the effects on violations compared to the status quo into a percent change in foodborne illness 
hospitalizations (Column 4). We do so by multiplying the percent change in the average predicted number 
of violations between the scenario and the status quo (Column 2) by the ratio of 20% decrease in 
foodborne illness hospitalizations per 5% improvement in restaurant compliance scores based on prior 
research of Los Angeles restaurants (Jin and Leslie 2003). For example, to assess the overall effect of 
inspector’s fatigue from prior work earlier in the day (row 1), we multiply the 3.1% increase in the 
number of violations cited per inspection described earlier (Column 2) by the ratio of 20% decrease in 
hospitalizations per 5% improved restaurant score, which indicates that hospitalizations would decrease 
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by 12.3% if inspector fatigue associated with prior work in a workday were eliminated. Similarly, 
hospitalizations would have been 5.5% lower in the absence of the potentially shift-prolonging effect 
(calculated as 1.4% * [-20% / 5%]); row 3).  
We then estimate the difference in annual nationwide foodborne illness hospitalizations (Column 
5) and annual nationwide foodborne illness cases (Column 6) that would arise in the absence of each 
effect, as well as the cost implications (Column 7). Our calculations are based on (1) the estimated annual 
128,000 hospitalizations and 47.8 million foodborne illness cases that actually occurred (Scallan et al. 
2011) and (2) two alternative estimates of the average cost per foodborne illness of $747 (Minor et al. 
2015) and $1,626 (Scharff 2012) to construct the lower and upper bound of our total cost estimates. To 
estimate the impact on foodborne illness hospitalizations (Column 5), we compare the estimated number 
of nationwide annual hospitalizations that would have occurred in each scenario to the 128,000 
hospitalizations that actually occurred, and calculate the difference by multiplying the rate of change (in 
Column 4) by the 128,000 hospitalizations. Because only 128,000 of the 47.8 million annual foodborne 
illnesses result in hospitalization, we compute the impact on illnesses (Column 6) by multiplying the 
estimated impact on hospitalizations (Column 5) by the ratio of 47.8 million to 128,000 (that is, 373.4 
foodborne illness cases per foodborne illness hospitalization). For example, eliminating the effects of the 
number of prior inspections today (row 1) would result in 15,711 fewer hospitalizations, a 12.3% decline 
from the status quo of 128,000 hospitalizations, and 5.87 million fewer foodborne illness cases (row 1). 
Multiplying this 5.87 million fewer foodborne illness cases that would result (Column 6) by the $747 or 
$1,626 cost per case, we estimate that $4.383 to $9.540 billion in foodborne illness costs could be saved 
per year if the effects of the number of prior inspections today were eliminated nationwide.  
We similarly estimate that the combined effect of the two daily schedule effects we identified 
(number of prior inspections today and potentially shift-prolonging effects; see row 3) is resulting in 
109,140 undetected violations per year nationwide, which are associated with 23,056 excess foodborne 
illness hospitalizations, 8.61 million excess foodborne illness cases, and $6,432 to $14,000 million in 
estimated costs. Such unreported violations and excess illnesses and costs could be avoided if steps were 
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taken to mitigate inspector fatigue, such as by restricting inspectors to a single inspection per day. Any 
such policies to mitigate fatigue should be pilot tested and the benefits weighed against the potential 
additional labor costs they might impose. We also estimate that 110,800 violations per year nationwide 
are being detected thanks to the combined effect of the two outcome effects we identified (prior inspected 
establishment’s violations and prior inspected establishment’s violation trend), which are preventing 
23,407 foodborne illness hospitalizations and 8.74 illness cases, with an estimated cost of $6,529 to 
$14,213 million (row 6). 
4.6. Robustness Tests  
We conduct several analyses to confirm the robustness of our findings. Our primary results are based on a 
conservative approach that includes establishment-inspector-dyad fixed effects. We find similar results 
whether we instead include establishment fixed effects or separate sets of fixed effects for inspectors and 
for establishments (see footnote 9 for details). Also, to assess whether unusually busy days, which might 
lead inspectors to become especially fatigued, might be driving our schedule-induced fatigue (H1) results, 
we reestimated our models on the subsample of inspector-days with no more than six inspections (the 
99th percentile). Our hypothesized results are robust to these subsample tests.  
Our results regarding the effects of schedule-induced fatigue (H1) hold even when we measure 
this construct using any of the following three alternative approaches rather than the number of prior 
inspections on the day of the focal inspection. In our first alternative, we calculate the actual cumulative 
minutes inspectors spent onsite in their prior inspections that day to better account for the fact that 
inspection duration can differ and that longer (and not just more numerous) inspections are likely to cause 
more fatigue. Our second alternative approach accommodates the potential concern that fatigue increased 
the duration of prior inspections. Here, we calculate the anticipated cumulative minutes inspectors would 
expect to have spent onsite in their prior inspections that day, computed as the average of the durations of 
those establishments’ previous two inspections (or their single previous inspection if only one is 
available). In our third alternative approach, we compute the predicted cumulative minutes inspectors 
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would spend onsite in their prior inspections that day, using the predicted durations derived from an 
ordinary least squares regression model, with a log transformed outcome variable and including the 
covariates from the corresponding main specification. 
Our results are also robust to including as additional controls in our primary models indicator 
variables denoting the day of the week the inspection occurred. Our results are mostly robust to 
substituting our three time-of-day periods (breakfast period, lunch period, and dinner period) with 
indicator variables for each hour of the day at which the inspection occurred. Only the potentially shift-
prolonging coefficient is no longer statistically significant, likely due to the higher multicollinearity 
introduced by this approach.  
4.7. Extensions  
In this section, we extend our primary analysis along several dimensions. We first test whether outcome-
effects persist beyond the inspector’s very next inspection and beyond the same day. We then investigate 
the extent to which these effects influence the citing of different types of violation, distinguishing 
between critical and noncritical violations. We also consider how other aspects of inspections are 
affected, focusing on inspection duration, citation pace, and comments documenting violations. 
4.7.1. Persistence of Outcome-effects. Our primary models examine the extent to which an 
inspector’s experience at the prior establishment influences the number of violations cited at his or her 
next inspection. To explore whether these outcome-effects persist longer, we added to our models the 
penultimate inspected establishment’s violations (that is, two establishments ago) and then also the 
antepenultimate inspected establishment’s violations (that is, three establishments ago). Appendix Table 
C2 reports the results in Columns 1 and 2, respectively, which indicate that the number of violations cited 
in an inspection significantly affects the next three inspections; the declining coefficient magnitudes 
suggest that the effect dissipates.  
We also assess whether outcome-effects persist as strongly after inspectors have the opportunity 
to take an overnight break. To compare between-day versus within-day spillovers, we split the prior 
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inspected establishment’s violations into the following two variables. Prior inspected establishment’s 
violations for the first inspection of the day equals prior inspected establishment’s violations for the first 
inspection of the day and equals 0 for all inspections conducted later in the day. Prior inspected 
establishment’s violations for the second+ inspection of the day is coded oppositely: it equals prior 
inspected establishment’s violations for all inspections other than the first of the day and equals 0 for the 
first inspection of the day. Estimating our primary model but substituting these two variables for prior 
inspected establishment’s violations (Column 3 of Appendix Table C2) yields coefficients on prior 
inspected establishment’s violations for the first inspection of the day (β = 0.016, p < 0.01) and prior 
inspected establishment’s violations for the second+ inspection of the day (β = 0.015, p < 0.01) that are 
statistically indistinguishable (Wald χ2 = 0.03, p = 0.86). This indicates that outcome-effects persist to the 
same extent whether or not successive inspections occur on the same day or across different days.  
4.7.2. Critical versus Noncritical Violations. To assess whether our hypothesized relationships 
differentially influence inspectors’ behavior across different types of violations, we estimated our models 
on two subsets of violations. First, we predict the number of critical violations, which are related to food 
preparation practices and employee behaviors that more directly contribute to foodborne illness or injury. 
These factors are prioritized in Alaska and in Camden County by being displayed on the first page of the 
inspection report and in Lake County by being tagged in the reports. Second, we estimated our models on 
the number of noncritical violations (that is, violations of procedures often referred to as “good retail 
practices”). While less risky than the other type, these are also important for public health and include 
overall sanitation and preventative measures to protect foods, such as proper use of gloves. Inspections 
averaged 0.93 critical violations and 1.49 noncritical violations (see Table C1 for other summary 
statistics of these variables). 
Appendix Table C3 reports the results. The estimated coefficients on the controls highlight the 
heterogeneity across these two types of violation. Though, on average, more noncritical violations are 
cited in inspections conducted during the breakfast period, there is no evidence that time of day affects 
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critical violations. This is consistent with critical violations being related to longer-term establishment 
practices which are insensitive to the number of customers being served or the staff’s ability to respond to 
the inspector’s presence. 
We find that the daily-schedule effects identified in our primary results are driven by noncritical 
violations rather than critical violations. In particular, we find no evidence that citations of critical 
violations are affected by daily-schedule affects: the coefficients on number of prior inspections today 
and potentially shift-prolonging are not statistically significant (Columns 1 and 2). This suggests that 
fatigue does not affect inspectors’ ability to discover and report critical violations. In contrast, an 
inspector’s daily schedule has large statistically significant effects on noncritical violations (Columns 3 
and 4). The negative, statistically significant coefficients on number of prior inspections today (β = -
0.041, p < 0.01) indicate that each subsequent inspection during the day results, on average, in 4.02% 
fewer noncritical violations being cited. The negative statistically significant coefficient on potentially 
shift-prolonging (β = -0.060, p < 0.05) indicates that such inspections result in 5.82% fewer citations.  
Outcome-spillovers are more ubiquitous, affecting critical and noncritical violations alike. The 
magnitudes of the positive, statistically significant coefficients on prior inspected establishment’s 
violations indicate that, on average, each additional violation cited at the inspector’s prior inspected 
establishment is associated with 1.82% more critical violations (Column 1: β = 0.018, p < 0.01) and 
1.41% more noncritical violations (Column 3: β = 0.014, p < 0.01) cited in the focal inspection.  
As with total violations, there is no evidence of critical and noncritical violations being affected 
by the inspection being conducted after salient improvement was observed in the inspector’s prior 
inspected establishment, that is, when the prior inspected establishment saliently improved. When the 
prior inspected establishment saliently deteriorated, inspections yield, on average, 7.36% more critical 
violations (Column 2: β = 0.071, p < 0.10) and 7.79% more noncritical violations (Column 4: β = 0.075, p 
< 0.05).  
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Overall, these results indicate that inspectors’ schedules have somewhat different effects on citing 
critical versus noncritical violations. Citing noncritical violations appears to be influenced by both daily 
schedule effects and outcome-spillovers, while citing critical violations appears to be influenced only by 
outcome-spillovers. 
4.7.3. Inspector Speed and Citation Pace. Our primary results show how daily schedules and 
inspections of prior establishments are associated with the number of violations cited. To assess whether 
such results might be driven by inspectors spending less time and exhibiting less scrutiny in the 
subsequent (focal) inspection, we estimate our primary models on the log of inspection duration, the 
number of minutes between an inspection’s start time and end time. Moreover, to assess the net of these 
two effects, we explore the inspector’s citation pace—a measure of productivity in this setting—and 
estimate our primary models on the log (after adding 1) of violation citations per hour. The results are 
reported in Table C4. 
We find that inspectors conduct inspections more quickly as they progress through their shift: 
inspection duration decreases by 3.5% for each subsequent inspection conducted within a day (Column 1: 
number of prior inspections today β = -0.035, p < 0.01). For context, recall that our primary results 
indicate that each subsequent inspection during the day cites an average of 3.15% fewer violations. The 
model reported in Column 3 of Table C4 indicates that the net effect is that inspector citation pace 
decreases by 1.3% for each subsequent inspection of the day (number of prior inspections today β = -
0.013, p < 0.10). 
Turning to potentially shift-prolonging inspections, recall that our primary results indicated that 
these had 5.07% fewer citations. Column 1 of Table C4 reveals that inspectors conduct such inspections 
3.6% more quickly (potentially shift-prolonging β = -0.036, p < 0.01). Column 3 reveals that the effect of 
potentially shift-prolonging on citation pace is not statistically significant. These results suggest that the 
diminishments in citations result from shorter inspection durations rather than slower inspector’ speed, 
with inspectors’ citation pace remaining largely unaffected by the risk of working beyond their typical 
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end of shift. This suggests that our earlier finding that potentially shift prolonging inspections result in 
fewer violations is likely due to inspectors’ desire to avoid working late, rather than fatigue eroding their 
citation pace. 
Turning to potential outcome-effects, we find no evidence that the outcome of the inspector’s 
prior inspection affects inspection duration, as the coefficients on the variables related to the prior 
inspected establishment’s violations and violation trend are not statistically significant (Columns 1 and 2 
of Table C4). Recall that our primary results found that more violations and worsening trends at an 
inspector’s prior establishment predicted that the inspector cited more violations at the focal inspection. 
Results reported in Column 3 of Table C4 indicate that inspectors’ citation pace increases by 1.0% for 
each additional violation at the prior establishment (β = 0.010, p < 0.01) and by 1.9% for each one-
standard-deviation increase in the prior inspected establishment’s violation trend (β = 0.012, p < 0.05). 
Column 4 indicates that, as was the case with the number of violations, the latter effect is asymmetric and 
driven by negative trends: whereas we find no change in inspectors’ citation pace after inspecting an 
establishment that exhibited salient improvement, it does increase by 3.9% after inspecting an 
establishment that exhibited salient deterioration. This indicates that our earlier outcome-effect findings—
that more violations and worsening trends at an inspector’s prior establishment increase the inspector’s 
citations at his or her next inspection—result from inspectors increasing their citation pace rather than 
spending more time onsite.  
4.7.4. Violation Documentation. We investigate whether our hypothesized spillovers also 
affected the text comments that inspectors sometimes included to annotate violations. Fatigue might cause 
inspectors not to put as much effort into documenting the violations they cite, decreasing the average 
length of these comments. To assess documentation effort, we measure an inspection’s average violation 
comment length as the number of characters14 the inspector typed into the comment field accompanying 
each cited violation (empty comment fields had zero characters), averaged across all violations cited in 
                                                      
14 Results are substantively similar if we instead use the number of words. 
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that inspection. This variable is coded as missing for inspections that had no cited violations. We also 
calculated versions of this metric separately for critical and noncritical violations, which we refer to as 
average critical violation comment length and average noncritical violation comment length. We estimate 
the log (after adding 1) of each of these measures on our primary models, restricting the sample to those 
inspections with at least one violation, one critical violation and one noncritical violation, respectively 
(Appendix Table C5).  
The results yield no evidence of any type of daily-schedule effects on comment length, regardless 
of how we measured it. As for outcome-effects, we find no effect of prior inspected establishment’s 
violations on any measure of comment length, but we do find that worsening violation trends at the 
inspector’s prior establishment are associated with shorter comments except for noncritical violations. 
Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in the prior inspected establishment’s violation trend is 
associated with an average 1.1% decrease in the number of violation comment words in the focal 
inspection (Column 7: β = -0.007, p < 0.10) and a comparable average 1.1% decrease in the comment 
length in terms of number of characters (Column 1: β = -0.007, p < 0.10). Decomposing the latter effect 
reveals an average 1.6% decrease in the comment length for critical violations (Column 3: β = -0.010, p < 
0.05) and no average impact on the comment length for noncritical violations (Column 5). Columns 2 and 
8 reveal that these effects are driven by decreases in comment length after inspectors observe salient 
deterioration, rather than increases in comment length after observing salient improvement.  
Overall, considered along with our citation pace results, these documentation findings suggest 
that a potential mechanism by which outcome-effects increase citation pace (that is, improve inspectors’ 
productivity in citing violations) is by focusing attention on detection at the (less costly) expense of 
reducing documentation. Because each violation citation references the regulatory code infringed and 
only on some occasions does customization of violation comments provide additional value, we interpret 
these results as suggesting that inspectors successfully redirect their attention to important matters.  
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5. Discussion 
We find strong evidence that inspectors’ scrutiny is affected by their daily schedules and their experience 
at the immediately preceding inspection. As inspectors conduct additional inspections throughout the day, 
their scrutiny is eroded by increasing fatigue and by the perceived time pressure to complete their final 
inspection of the day at their usual time. We also find strong evidence that inspector scrutiny is influenced 
by their experience at their prior inspected establishment. 
5.1. Contributions 
Our work contributes to three literature streams. First, this study is among the first to bring an operational 
lens to the literature on monitoring and assessment of standards adherence. In particular, we identify 
important scheduling effects on the scrutiny and thus the accuracy of those who monitor establishments’ 
adherence to standards. Our analysis of the effects of the timing of an inspection during inspectors’ daily 
schedules and of the spillover effects from the outcomes of prior inspections at other establishments 
complements this literature’s focus on improving the effectiveness of monitoring schemes.  
Second, by identifying spillover effects between inspections, our findings contribute to a related 
literature on the spillover effects of regulatory sanctions (e.g., Cohen 2000, Shimshack and Ward 2005). 
While that literature focuses on how an inspection agency’s monitoring efforts and enforcement actions 
affect its reputation for stringency, which has a spillover influence on other establishments’ compliance, 
our study focuses on how inspectors’ experiences at one establishment have spillover effects on their 
scrutiny at subsequent inspections of other establishments. Ours is thus the first study of which we are 
aware that identifies spillover effects on inspector stringency associated not only with the outcomes of the 
immediately preceding inspection, but also with how many prior inspections an inspector had already 
conducted that day and with the inspector’s apparent desire to avoid prolonging the workday. Moreover, 
our work contributes to the nascent literature on the accuracy of inspections—specifically, of regulatory 
regimes and third-party monitoring of labor conditions in supply chains—that has largely focused on how 
inspector bias is due to economic conflicts of interest or site-specific experience (e.g., Duflo et al. 2013, 
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Short and Toffel 2016, Short, Toffel, and Hugill 2016, Ball, Siemsen, and Shah 2017). Our study is the 
first to our knowledge that brings the operational lens of scheduling to this literature by showing how 
work schedules can drive inaccuracies.  
Third, our work also contributes to the literature on the performance implications of scheduling 
and task sequencing. By examining actual decisions with important consequences for public health, we 
contribute to the recent attempts to explore high-stakes decision making in field settings (e.g., Chen et al. 
2016). While our findings may be consistent with status-quo bias increasing with the cumulative number 
of decisions over a day, we find that this bias manifests as inspectors becoming less stringent (by citing 
fewer violations), which contrasts with prior work that finds decision makers becoming more stringent 
over the course of the day (Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso 2011). In our context, conducting 
additional food safety inspections throughout the day leads to mental and physical fatigue, eroding the 
inspector’s ability to engage in physical effort and in social interactions with establishment staff (and the 
resulting impact on emotions and perceptions), which reduces violation detection and thus inspection 
quality. Our daily schedule effects findings complement the literature that has found that increased 
worker fatigue after long hours has led to accidents among nuclear and industrial plant operators, airline 
pilots, truck drivers, and hospital workers (Dinges 1995, Landrigan et al. 2004) and that workers seek to 
reduce their workload as they approach their end of shift (Chan 2015).15 In response to such findings, 
industry standards and regulations have established caps on the number of consecutive work hours in 
some of these professions, but those rules remain controversial and their benefits are still being assessed. 
We contribute to this debate by providing evidence of the negative effects of fatigue on the quality of 
work during shorter periods (normal shifts, rather than the overwork examined in prior studies), in a 
different setting (health inspections), focusing on primary (rather than secondary) tasks, and by 
identifying potential remedies. Our results suggest that inspectors themselves seek to ameliorate the 
                                                      
15 Chan (2015) finds that hospital emergency department physicians approaching their end of shift accept fewer patients and 
spend less time with them. Whereas that study focuses on fixed shifts where physicians can pass along unfinished work to the 
next shift, our study focuses on inspectors who work without fixed shifts, do not pass along unfinished work to others, and do not 
stop working on an unfinished inspection once it has begun. 
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effects of their schedules (for example, by focusing their attention on critical violations at the expense of 
detecting fewer noncritical violations and producing less documentation), yet less-demanding work hours 
would improve inspection accuracy. 
In addition, our work responds to the call for behavioral research in the operations management 
field (Bendoly, Donohue, and Schultz 2006, Gino and Pisano 2008) by identifying ways in which task 
sequencing affects worker behavior. Our finding that inspectors’ experiences at prior inspections bias 
their subsequent inspections shows that the outcome of tasks can affect how humans—unlike machines—
perform their next task. 
5.2. Managerial Implications 
By revealing biases that result from inspector schedules, our findings highlight opportunities to mitigate 
bias through alternative scheduling policies. This has important implications for inspectors focusing on 
their own companies’ processes, third-party inspectors hired by buyers to assess their suppliers, and 
government inspectors assessing compliance with regulations governing occupational safety, 
environmental conditions, food safety, and other topics. Managers can develop strategies to improve 
inspection accuracy by seeking to reduce both the extent to which these biases erode inspection accuracy 
and the consequences of these biases.   
One way to reduce the extent to which these biases erode inspection accuracy is to impose a cap 
on the number of inspections conducted each day to limit the deleterious effects of fatigue, although this 
risks reducing inspection capacity. Another approach, which can be used at the same time, is to minimize 
the number of shift-prolonging inspections by reallocating an inspector’s weekly schedule to reduce 
variation in the predicted completion time of their final inspection each day or by shifting administrative 
tasks (such as office meetings) from the beginning to the end of the day. Our computations suggests that, 
in our setting, eliminating these two factors would result in 4.5% more citations, which, translated into 
health benefits, correspond to 18% fewer hospitalizations for foodborne illness. Reorganization of 
inspectors’ schedules could eliminate these negative outcomes.  
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Our identified outcome-effects imply that increasing the salience of noncompliance and the need 
to enforce regulation could increase the number of violations detected. This suggests that reminders or 
other ways to increase such salience could potentially be a lever for inspection managers to increase the 
stringency of inspectors, even if the information is already available to them and despite their innate 
desire to protect consumers.  
Managers can also use our findings to develop policies to reduce the consequences of inspector 
biases eroding inspection accuracy. For example, understanding that scrutiny typically declines as 
inspectors (a) conduct successive inspections during the day and (b) conduct inspections that risk 
prolonging their shift, the inspectors themselves could be required to schedule establishments that pose 
greater risks earlier in the shift. By improving inspector effectiveness in the case of food safety, these 
changes could reduce risk to public health.      
5.3. Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has several limitations that could be explored in future research. Though our data contains 
details of inspections and citations, we do not observe inspectors’ beliefs or their interactions with the 
establishment personnel. We find that inspectors cite fewer violations after inspecting establishments that 
had fewer violations. Perhaps they make less effort to find hidden violations and are more willing to take 
a coaching approach—emphasizing education over enforcement and training operators to operate with 
better hygiene for borderline violations—rather than writing citations. Possible extensions of our study 
could use observations of these actions to quantify their relative roles on the net effects. In addition, 
although our research context—food safety inspections—is common worldwide, it is just one of many 
types of inspection conducted by companies and governments. Future research should examine whether 
the relationships we identified hold in other contexts.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max 
Violations Number of violations cited in the inspection 2.42 2.73 0 25 
Number of prior 
inspections today 
Number of inspections that the inspector had 
already conducted before the focal inspection on the 
same day 
0.94 1.10 0 9 
Potentially shift-
prolonging  
Indicates if the anticipated end time of an inspection 
(calculated as the inspection start time plus the 
duration of that establishment’s previous inspection) 
falls after the inspector’s running average daily 
clock-out time based on all of that inspector’s 
preceding days in our sample  




Number of violations cited at the establishment 
inspected by the inspector immediately prior to the 
focal inspection 




Percentage change in the number of violations at 
that establishment between that day’s inspection and 
its previous inspection (adding one to the 
denominator to avoid dividing by zero) 




Indicates if the inspector’s prior inspected 
establishment improved saliently (i.e., its current 
inspection yielded at least two fewer violations than 
its previous inspection)  




Indicates if the inspector’s prior inspected 
establishment deteriorated saliently (i.e, its current 
inspection yielded at least two more violations than 
its previous inspection)  
0.21 0.41 0 1 
Inspector experience Number of inspections the inspector had conducted 
(at any establishment) since the beginning of our 
sample period by the time he or she began the focal 
inspection 
520.09 303.30 1 1429 
Returning inspector Indicates if the inspector of the focal inspection had 
inspected the establishment beforehand  
0.84 0.37 0 1 
Establishment’s nth 
inspection (second 
through tenth or more) 
Indicators that indicate whether an inspection is the 
establishment’s first, second, third (and so on) 
inspection in our sample period 
4.04 2.15 1 20 
Breakfast period 
(midnight to 10:59 am) 
Indicates if the inspection began midnight to 10:59 
am  
0.32 0.47 0 1 
Lunch period  
(11:00 am – 3:59 pm) 
Indicates if the inspection began 11:00 am – 3:59 
pm (omitted category) 
0.66 0.47 0 1 
Dinner period  
(4:00 pm–11:59 pm) 
Indicates if the inspection began 4:00 pm–11:59 pm 0.02 0.15 0 1 
           
N = 12,017 inspections     
  
45 
Table 2. Correlations 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Violations 1.00           
(2) Number of prior inspections today -0.02 1.00          
(3) Potentially shift-prolonging  -0.01 0.36 1.00         
(4) Prior inspected establishment’s violations 0.18 -0.03 0.03 1.00        
(5) Prior inspected establishment’s violation trend 0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.56 1.00       
(6) Prior inspected establishment saliently improved  0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.17 -0.37 1.00      
(7) Prior inspected establishment saliently deteriorated 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.60 0.69 -0.29 1.00     
(8) Inspector experience -0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 1.00    
(9) Returning inspector -0.14 -0.01 0.10 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.33 1.00   
(10) Establishment’s nth inspection  
(second through tenth or more) 
0.05 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.47 0.34 1.00  
(11) Breakfast period (midnight to 10:59 am) 0.01 -0.47 -0.41 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 1.00 
(12) Dinner period (4:00 pm–11:59 pm) 0.01 0.15 0.21 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 
             





Table 3. How Inspectors’ Schedules Influence Inspection Outcomes 
 




H1 Number of prior inspections today  -0.032*** -0.032*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
H2 Potentially shift-prolonging  -0.052** -0.051** 
  (0.025) (0.025) 
H3 Prior inspected establishment’s violations  0.015*** 0.014*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
H4 Prior inspected establishment’s violation trend  0.013**  
  (0.006)  
H5 Prior inspected establishment saliently improved   0.012 
   (0.023) 
H5 Prior inspected establishment saliently deteriorated   0.075*** 
   (0.027) 
 Inspector experience 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
 Returning inspector -0.116*** -0.118*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) 




 Dinner period (4:00 pm–11:59 pm) 0.000 -0.002 
  (0.078) (0.078) 
 Month fixed effects Included Included 
 Year fixed effects Included Included 
 Establishment's nth inspection (second through 
tenth or more) fixed effects 
Included Included 
 Inspection-type fixed effects Included Included 
 Establishment x Inspector fixed effects Included Included 
 Number of observations (inspections) 12,017 12,017 
Notes: Poisson regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by establishment.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.   
47 
 
Table 4. Estimates of Nationwide Effects 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   Impact on violations   Impact on health and associated costs 





















the status quo 



















compared to the 
status quo, in 
millions  
Change in nationwide 
annual costs of 
foodborne illness 
cases compared to the 
status quo, in millions 




Daily schedule effects           
1 Impact of eliminating number of prior 
inspections today effect  
2.498 3.07% 74,370   -12.27% -15,711 -5.87 -$4,383 -$9,540 
2 Impact of eliminating potentially 
shift-prolonging effect 
2.457 1.36% 33,020   -5.45% -6,976 -2.60 -$1,946 -$4,236 
3 Impact of eliminating both number of 
prior inspections today and 
potentially shift-prolonging effects 
2.533 4.50% 109,140   -18.01% -23,056 -8.61 -$6,432 -$14,000 
Outcome effects           
4 Impact of eliminating prior inspected 
establishment’s violations effect 
2.330 -3.88% -94,110   15.53% 19,881 7.42 $5,546 $12,072 
5 Impact of eliminating prior inspected 
establishment’s violation trend effect 
2.405 -0.77% -18,750   3.09% 3,961 1.48 $1,105 $2,405 
6 Impact of eliminating both prior 
inspected establishment’s violations 
and prior inspected establishment’s 
violation trend effects 
2.313 -4.57% -110,800   18.29% 23,407 8.74 $6,529 $14,213 
Column 1 is the average predicted number of violations per inspection, based on Model 1 of Table 4, under each scenario.  
Column 2 is calculated as the percent change in the average predicted number of violations per inspection, comparing each scenario (Column 1) to the status quo value of 2.42365. 
Column 3 is calculated as the difference in the average predicted number of violations per inspection, comparing each scenario (Column 1) to the status quo value of 2.42365, and 
multiplying this by the one million inspections that are conducted nationwide each year. 
Column 4 is calculated by multiplying the percent change in average predicted number of violations compared to the status quo (Column 2) by the ratio of the change in 
hospitalizations to the change in compliance (derived from the 20% hospitalizations decline per 5% improvement in restaurant compliance relationship reported by Jin and 
Leslie (2003), that is, -20%/5% = -4).  
Column 5 is calculated as the difference in hospitalizations between (a) the estimated number that would have occurred had the effects in this row not influenced hospitalizations 
and (b) the 128,000 that actually occurred. Specifically, we multiply the percent change in hospitalizations (Column 4) by the 128,000 nationwide annual hospitalizations. 
Column 6 is calculated by multiplying the change in nationwide annual number of foodborne illness hospitalizations compared to the status quo (Column 5) by the number of 
illness cases per hospitalization (derived from the ratio of the estimated 47.8 million annual foodborne illnesses to the resulting 128,000 hospitalizations by Scallan (2011), that 
is, 47.8 million/128,000). 
Columns 7 and 8 are calculated by multiplying the estimated change in illness cases (Column 6) by $747 (the weighted average from Minor et al (2015)) and $1,626 (the enhanced 
model estimate from Scharff (2012)) in estimated costs per illness case, respectively.
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Appendix A. Sample Construction and Restrictions 
 
Part 1. Sample Construction 
This appendix specifies how we converted the raw data into the estimation sample of 12,017 inspections 
of 3,399 establishments conducted on 6,880 inspector-days. The process consists of dropping duplicate 
records, correcting a.m./p.m. coding errors, constructing our measures, flagging remaining inspections 
with data errors and dropping those inspector-days, and omitting inspections that are dropped by our 
specification. 
Step 1. Dropping duplicate records. We began by correcting several types of problems in the raw data. 
We first removed duplicate inspection records that corresponded to the same establishment and starting 
and ending times. For each of these pairs or triplets, we kept the observation that reported the most 
violations because our interviews with inspectors indicated that the others likely represented unfinished 
reports accidently submitted prior to the inspection being completed. This excluded 46 inspection records 
and resulted in 38,065 inspections included in the raw data that Hazel Analytics provided. 
Because our specification results in an estimation sample that omits (a) inspector-establishment 
dyads that contain a single inspection, (b) inspector-establishment dyads with multiple inspections but all 
of which cited no violations, and (c) inspections for which the prior inspected establishment’s violation 
trend (and thus, prior inspected establishment saliently improved and prior inspected establishment 
saliently deteriorated) is not available, our potential estimation sample is limited to 14,965 inspections. 
We use all inspections to construct variables using the full histories of inspectors and establishments; for 
example, we compute the variables related to the inspector’s prior inspection using the inspector’s true 
prior inspection even if it took place at an establishment inspected only once by this inspector and was 
therefore excluded from the estimation sample. We take the following steps to address data errors and 
further refine the sample.  
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Step 2. Correcting a.m./p.m. coding errors. We then attempted to correct instances in which inspectors 
miscoded an inspection’s ending time as preceding its starting time. Our interviews with inspectors 
indicated that these instances very likely resulted from inspectors miscoding the a.m./p.m. field, which we 
corrected for 412 inspections (of which only 58 remain in our estimation sample) based on the following 
four scenarios:  
(1) When the ending time was coded as preceding its starting time, the start time was coded as p.m. and 
the ending time was coded as a.m., and the hour (0-11) of the starting time was higher than the hour 
of the ending time, we changed the start and ending times to a.m. and p.m., respectively. For example, 
if an inspection’s starting and ending times in the raw data appeared as 11 p.m. to 3 a.m., we 
corrected them to be 11 a.m. to 3 p.m.  
(2) When the ending time was coded as preceding its starting time, the start time was coded as p.m. and 
the ending time was coded as a.m., and the hour (0-11) of the starting time was lower than the hour of 
the ending time, we manually examined each record and changed either the start time to a.m. or the 
ending time to p.m., depending on which of the two changes seemed more reasonable in the context 
of the inspector’s day and full inspection history. 
(3) When the ending time was coded as preceding its starting time and both start and ending times were 
coded as a.m., we changed the ending time to p.m. For example, if an inspection’s starting and ending 
times in the raw data appeared as 10 a.m. to 2 a.m., we corrected the ending time to 2 p.m.  
(4) When the ending time was coded as preceding its starting time and both start and ending times were 
coded as p.m., we changed the start time to a.m. For example, if the starting and ending times were 
coded as 10 p.m. and 1 p.m., we changed the starting time to 10 a.m.  
We then examined another type of data entry error based on potential a.m./p.m. coding mistakes 
that led to start and/or end times occurring extremely early or late in the day—or in that shift—given that 
inspector’s routine starting and ending times. Considering the context of the inspector-day and the 
inspector’s full inspection history, we corrected the a.m./p.m. field for starting or ending times for 63 
inspections (10 in our estimation sample).  
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Finally, we reviewed the inspections that started in the a.m., ended in the p.m., and had a duration 
of more than six hours (e.g., starting at 7 a.m. and ending at 8 p.m.), as this indicated possible data errors. 
Using the approach described earlier, we corrected the a.m./p.m. field for starting or ending times for 163 
inspections (17 in our estimation sample). 
Altogether, these steps led to corrected a.m./p.m. values for 638 inspections from the raw data of 
38,065 inspections, which corresponds to only 85 inspections in our final estimation sample of 12,017 
inspections.  
Step 3. Construct measures. We then used the dataset with all the inspections to construct the measures, 
including those involving inspector sequences and lags. 
Step 4.  Flag remaining inspections with data errors and drop those inspector-days. We then 
identified inspections for which we could not adequately calculate relevant variables and dropped all 
inspector-days that contained any of these inspections because those inspector-days would not reflect the 
complete daily account of an inspector’s inspections. Specifically, we flagged inspections whose times 
overlapped with other inspections conducted by that inspector. Examples include a seafood market and its 
sushi bar, a coffee place and deli service located in the same grocery store, or different establishments in a 
food court.  We then flagged additional inspections whose end time was coded as preceding or equaling 
the start time. (This does not include those with a starting- or ending-time problem that was corrected, as 
described earlier, by adjusting the a.m./p.m. field.) We also flagged inspections that were coded as lasting 
more than 4.5 hours, which corresponds to the 99.4 percentile of inspection duration. To be conservative, 
we sought to estimate our model on only those inspector-days for which we had a complete daily account 
of the inspector’s inspections. Accordingly, we flagged not only the 4,726 inspections affected, but also 
the 2,350 additional inspections that were conducted on the inspector-days during which at least one 
flagged inspection took place. In other words, if one inspection had to be dropped, the whole inspector-
day was dropped. Accordingly, we excluded the 2,320 inspections that were flagged in our potential 
estimation sample of 14,965 inspections.   
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Step 5. Omit inspections dropped by our specification. As described earlier, our specification drops 
inspector-establishment dyads that either (a) contain a single observation, or (b) yielded zero violations in 
all inspections. Because of the changes made in the prior step, these restrictions led to further exclusion of 
628 inspections, resulting in a final estimation sample of 12,017 inspections of 3,399 establishments 
conducted on 6,880 inspector-days.  
Part 2. Results without Sample Restrictions 
These sample restrictions do not affect our inferences, as all of our hypothesized results continue to hold 
when using alternative specifications that use the full sample of inspections, that is, all observations in the 
raw dataset except the 46 duplicates believed to be data errors. Because our main Poisson specification 
automatically restricts the sample, we also estimated the primary models with ordinary least squares 
regression predicting the log of violations (after adding 1) using the full sample. Table A1 reports the 
results, which confirm the robustness of our findings. Table A2 provides the summary statistics for this 
full sample.  
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Table A1. Robustness Tests: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation Using Full Sample 
 
 Dependent variable: log (violations + 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
H1 Number of prior inspections today  -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
H2 Potentially shift-prolonging  -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) 
H3 Prior inspected establishment’s violations   0.012*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
H4 Prior inspected establishment’s violation trend    0.010**  
    (0.004)  
H5 Prior inspected establishment saliently improved     -0.005 
     (0.012) 
H5 Prior inspected establishment saliently deteriorated     0.039** 
     (0.016) 
 Inspector experience 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Returning inspector -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.102*** -0.102*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
 Breakfast period (midnight to 10:59 am) 0.008 0.008 0.016 0.016 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
 Dinner period (4:00 pm–11:59 pm) 0.011 0.010 0.019 0.019 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.036) (0.036) 
 Month fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
 Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
 Establishment's nth inspection (second through 
tenth or more) fixed effects 
Included Included Included Included 
 Inspection-type fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
 Establishment x Inspector fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
 Number of observations (inspections) 38,065 37,941 26,190 26,190 
 R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.29 
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by establishment.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.  
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Table A2. Summary Statistics for Full Sample (38,065 inspections) 
 
  Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
(1) Violations 38,065 1.95 2.43 0 25 
(2) Number of prior inspections today 38,065 1.03 1.34 0 17 
(3) Potentially shift-prolonging  38,065 0.21 0.41 0 1 
(4) Prior inspected establishment’s violations 37,941 1.95 2.43 0 25 
(5) Prior inspected establishment’s violation trend 
26,190 0.36 1.44 -0.95 23 
(6) Prior inspected establishment saliently improved  
26,190 0.23 0.42 0 1 
(7) Prior inspected establishment saliently deteriorated 
26,190 0.20 0.40 0 1 
(8) Inspector experience 38,065 359.01 318.45 0 1437 
(9) Returning inspector 38,065 0.47 0.50 0 1 
(10) Establishment’s inspection sequence 38,065 2.83 1.96 1 20 
(11) Breakfast period (midnight to 10:59 am) 38,065 0.33 0.47 0 1 





Appendix | Page 7 
Appendix B 
Table B1. Supplemental Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Inspection sequence within the day 
1st inspection of the day 5,328 
2nd inspection of the day 3,618 
3rd inspection of the day 1,971 
4th inspection of the day 763 
5th inspection of the day 248 
6th inspection of the day 61 
7th+ inspection of the day 28 
Total number of inspections: 12,017 
 
Panel B. Number of inspector-days 
 
1 inspection days 1,790 
2 inspection days 2,226 
3 inspection days 1,637 
4 inspection days 801 
5 inspection days 295 
6 inspection days 83 
7+ inspection days 48 
Total number of inspector-days: 6,880 
 
Panel C. Inspections by hour begun and corresponding meal period 
 
7 am or earlier 39 
3,856 during breakfast period 8 am 222 9 am 972 
10 am 2,623 
11 am 1,986 
7,888 during lunch period 
 
12 pm 1,331 
1 pm  2,331 
2 pm  1,653 
3 pm  587 
4 pm 171 
273 during dinner period 5 pm 59 
6 pm or later 43 
Total number of inspections: 12,017  
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Figure B1. The stability in medians and interquartile-ranges of establishments’ previous inspection 
outcomes across sequential inspections within a day suggests that inspectors did not create their 
daily schedule based on establishments’ previous violation counts. 
 
Note. This figure displays a box-and-whisker plot of the number of violations cited at each 
establishment’s previous inspection, categorized by when during an inspector’s daily schedule its 
subsequent (that is, focal) inspection took place. The box represents the interquartile range segmented by 















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
Sequence during an inspector’s day when the establishment’s focal inspection was conducted
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Appendix C 
Table C1. Extensions: Summary Statistics 
 
  Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
(1) Penultimate inspected establishment’s 
violations 
12,014 2.10 2.60 0 25 
(2) Antepenultimate inspected establishment’s 
violations 
12,008 2.07 2.57 0 25 
(3) Prior inspected establishment’s violations for 
the first inspection of the day 
12,017 0.96 2.05 0 25 
(4) Prior inspected establishment’s violations for 
the second+ inspection of the day 
12,017 1.15 2.21 0 23 
(5) Critical violations 12,017 0.93 1.27 0 11 
(6) Noncritical violations 12,017 1.49 1.94 0 16 
(7) log inspection duration  12,017 4.01 0.55 1.61 5.60 
(8) log violation citations per hour 12,017 0.96 0.71 0 3.76 
(9) log average violation comment length 8,938 4.66 0.63 0 7.90 
(10) log average critical violation comment length 6,083 4.89 0.64 0 7.16 
(11) log average noncritical violation comment 
length 
7,119 4.43 0.59 0 7.90 
(12) log average number of words in violation 
comments 
8,938 2.94 0.58 0 6.06 
(13) Inspection duration (minutes) 12,017 62.87 32.01 5 270 
(14) Violation citations per hour 12,017 2.35 2.66 0 42 
(15) Average violation comment length 8,938 130.83 112.68 0 2687 
(16) Average critical violation comment length 6,083 164.28 125.42 0 1,287.50 
(17) Average noncritical violation comment length 7,119 102.28 93.06 0 2687 
(18) Average number of words in violation 
comments 
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Table C2. Persistence of Outcome-effects 
 
Dependent variable: violations 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Number of prior inspections today  -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.031*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) Potentially shift-prolonging  -0.057** -0.058** -0.052** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) Prior inspected establishment’s violations  0.015*** 0.015***  
 (0.004) (0.004)  Penultimate inspected establishment’s violations 0.010*** 0.009***  
  (0.003) (0.003)  
Antepenultimate inspected establishment’s violations  0.006*  
   (0.004)  
Prior inspected establishment’s violations    0.016*** 
     for the first inspection of the day   (0.006) 
Prior inspected establishment’s violations    0.015*** 
     for the second+ inspection of the day   (0.005) 
Prior inspected establishment’s violation trend  0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) Inspector experience 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Returning inspector -0.119*** -0.121*** -0.116*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
Breakfast period (midnight to 10:59 am)  0.055** 0.056** 0.055** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) Dinner period (4:00 pm–11:59 pm) -0.004 -0.008 -0.000 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) Month fixed effects Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Establishment's nth inspection (second through tenth or 
more) fixed effects 
Included Included Included 
Inspection-type fixed effects Included Included Included 
Establishment x Inspector fixed effects Included Included Included 
Number of observations (inspections) 12,011 12,000 12,017 
Notes: Poisson regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by establishment. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.   
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Table C3. Critical and Noncritical Violations 
 
 Dependent variable: critical violations  noncritical violations 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
H1 Number of prior inspections today -0.014 -0.014  -0.042*** -0.041*** 
       (0.015) (0.015)  (0.013) (0.013) H2 Potentially shift-prolonging  -0.037 -0.036  -0.060** -0.059** 
  (0.036) (0.036)  (0.030) (0.029) H3 Prior inspected establishment’s violations 0.018*** 0.015***  0.014*** 0.013*** 
       (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.005) H4 Prior inspected establishment’s violation trend 0.013*   0.012*  
       (0.008)   (0.007)  H5 After salient improvement   -0.016   0.029 
   (0.031)   (0.028) H5 After salient deterioration   0.071*   0.074** 
 
  (0.039)   (0.031) 
 
Breakfast period 0.046 0.046  0.063** 0.063** 
 
     (midnight to 10:59 am) (0.035) (0.035)  (0.030) (0.030) 
 
Dinner period 0.041 0.040  -0.039 -0.041 
 
     (4:00 pm–11:59 pm) (0.097) (0.097)  (0.100) (0.100) 
 
Inspector experience 0.001*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Previous inspector -0.113** -0.114**  -0.105** -0.107*** 
  (0.049) (0.049)  (0.041) (0.041) 
  Month fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
 
Year fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
 
Establishment's nth inspection (second 
through tenth or more) fixed effects 
Included Included  Included Included 
 
Inspection-type fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
 Establishment x Inspector fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
  Number of observations (inspections) 10,298 10,298  10,624 10,624 
Notes: Poisson regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by establishment.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.   
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Table C4. Effects of Inspectors’ Schedules on Speed and Citation Pace 
 
 
 Inspector speed  Inspector citation pace 
Dependent variable:  log inspection duration  log (violation citations per hour + 1) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Number of prior inspections today  -0.035*** -0.035***  -0.013* -0.014* 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Potentially shift-prolonging  -0.036*** -0.036***  -0.025 -0.024 
 (0.011) (0.011)  (0.018) (0.018) 
Prior inspected establishment’s violations  0.002 0.002  0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Prior inspected establishment’s violation trend  -0.001   0.012**  
 (0.003)   (0.005)  
Prior inspected establishment saliently improved   0.010   -0.017 
  (0.009)   (0.016) 
Prior inspected establishment saliently deteriorated   0.004   0.038* 
  (0.012)   (0.020) 
Inspector experience 0.000 0.000  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Returning inspector 0.079*** 0.079***  -0.100*** -0.100*** 
 (0.016) (0.016)  (0.024) (0.024) 
Breakfast period (midnight to 10:59 am) 0.036*** 0.036***  -0.013 -0.013 
 
(0.011) (0.011)  (0.018) (0.018) 
Dinner period (4:00 pm–11:59 pm) -0.036 -0.036  0.053 0.051 
 (0.032) (0.032)  (0.053) (0.053) 
Month fixed effects Included Included   Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
Establishment's nth inspection (second through 
tenth or more) fixed effects Included Included   Included Included 
Inspection-type fixed effects Included Included  Included Included 
Establishment x Inspector fixed effects Included Included   Included Included 
Number of observations (inspections) 12,017 12,017  12,017 12,017 
R-squared 0.45 0.45  0.20 0.20 
Notes: Ordinary least squares coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by establishment.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.   
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Table C5. Effects of Inspectors’ Schedules on Documentation 
   
Dependent variable: log (average violation 
comment length + 1) 
log (average critical 
violation comment 
length + 1) 
log (average 
noncritical violation 
comment length + 1) 
log (average number of 
words in violation 
comments + 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of prior inspections 
today 
-0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Potentially shift-prolonging  0.003 0.003 0.022 0.022 -0.015 -0.015 0.008 0.008 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Prior inspected establishment’s 
violations  
0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Prior inspected establishment’s 
violation trend 
-0.007*  -0.010**  0.000  -0.007*  
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Prior inspected establishment 
saliently improved  
 -0.013  -0.011  -0.006  -0.009 
 (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.013) 
Prior inspected establishment 
saliently deteriorated  
 -0.032*  -0.038  -0.002  -0.033** 
 (0.016)  (0.025)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Inspector experience 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Returning inspector -0.020 -0.019 -0.010 -0.008 -0.030 -0.030 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) 
Breakfast period                    
(midnight to 10:59 am) 
-0.024 -0.025 -0.007 -0.006 -0.029 -0.029 -0.020 -0.020 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) 
Dinner period                             
(4:00 pm–11:59 pm) 
0.025 0.026 -0.052 -0.051 0.034 0.034 0.006 0.006 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.064) (0.064) (0.057) (0.057) (0.042) (0.042) 
Month fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Establishment's nth inspection 
(second through tenth or 
more) fixed effects 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Inspection-type fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Establishment x Inspector 
fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations (inspections) 8,938 8,938 6,083 6,083 7,119 7,119 8,938 8,938 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Notes: Ordinary least squares coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by establishment.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.  
